

# The Doctrine of The self in Jainism

Most of the systems of Indian thought accept the

existence of an eternal spiritual entity called *ātman*, *puruṣa*, *brahman* or *jīva*. Buddhism, however, is exceptional in not acknowledging the reality of a permanent *ātman*. In this chapter we will make an attempt to study the notion of *ātman* or self in Jainism. The Jaina conception of *ātman* can be understood better in the light of Brahmanical and Buddhist attitudes toward the idea of the self. We will, therefore, first make a brief survey of the different strands in the evolution of the Brahmanical doctrine of the self.

## THE DOCTRINE OF THE SELF IN BRAHMANISM

The Indian word for self is *ātman*. It is difficult to find a precise English translation of Sanskrit word *ātman*. In modern English writings the terms self, spirit, being, and soul are often used for it. As a matter of fact the connotation of the word *ātman* includes the meanings of self, soul, the breath, the living principle, the faculty of thought, and reason. For our purpose here we will use the word self as a synonym of Sanskrit *ātman*. The different forms of this word in Indian literature and other terms of cognate significance are, however, noteworthy. Thus the word *ātman* occurs already in the Vedic literature. The Pali form *attā*, the Prākṛit form *appā*, and the Śauraseni Prākṛit form *ādā* are well known. In the Brahmanical literature we find, besides *ātman*, that *prāṇa*, *jīva* and *brahman* are sometimes used as synonyms. The word *prāṇa* stands for the vital breath. The term *jīva* signifies living principle. The word *ātman* refers to the self, to one's own nature or existence. The word *brahman* has acquired a special metaphysical sense in Hinduism, referring to the Ultimate Reality. In this case, when *ātman* is identified with *brahman*, the self is another name for Ultimate Reality.

In the old Vedic texts the word *ātman* is understood to mean the vital breath. In some places in the Ṛgveda the word *manas* is considered as the seat of thought, dwelling in heart, as it were. In the Upaniṣads both terms, *ātman* as well as *brahman* are found used rather in an irregular fashion. It has been suggested that the word *brahman* originally meant 'Sacred knowledge', 'prayer' or 'magical formula'; the compounds such as *brahmavat* 'possessed of magic formula' and *brahmavarcase* 'superiority in sacred knowledge' suggest that the word *brahman* meant not only magical or religious knowledge but also the power inherent in sacred hymns, prayers, mantras and in their knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

## THE UPANIṢADS

The most famous doctrine of the Upaniṣads is the doctrine of the self conceived as the Ultimate Reality. In the old Upaniṣads *ātman* is declared to be one, eternal, conscious, of the nature of bliss and present everywhere; the *ātman* is the source of all that is; it is the ground of the universe. In some passages of the Upaniṣads this *ātman* is identified with *brahman*.

*Brahman* is the cosmic principle of the universe, the reality which is both immanent in the universe and transcendent to it. In other words *brahman* or God and *ātman* or self are in essence one. This idea of the unity of ultimate Truth was elaborated and systematized in the Advaita school of Vedānta. But the old Upaniṣads contain conflicting opinions about the nature of the self.

The *Taittirīya* Upaniṣad describes five forms of *ātman*: namely *annamaya*, *prāṇamaya*, *manōmaya*, *vijñānamaya* and *ānandamaya*.<sup>2</sup> In the same Upaniṣad, it is stated that *Brahman*

1. R.E. Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads*, pp. 14-15. S.N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol.I, p.211, has made the following observation. "The word Brahman originally meant in the earliest Vedic literature, *mantra*, duly performed sacrifice, and also the power of sacrifice which could bring about the desired result".
2. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, II, 1-5.

is food, breath, mind, understanding and bliss, since out of each of those, things are born, live and die. This means that *ātman* or *brahman* is identifiable as food, breath, mind, understanding and bliss.

In several passages of the Upaniṣads *ātman* or *brahman* is the source of creation. Thus the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* says that 'having created it, He entered into it'.<sup>3</sup> In the *Chāndōgya Upaniṣad*, *brahman* is described as life, joy and void. This Upaniṣadic doctrine of *ātman* is thus pantheistic. *Ātman* is everywhere, in every thing.<sup>4</sup> In the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* we read the following passage :

Brahman, indeed, is this immortal, Brahman before,  
Brahman behind, to right and to left  
Stretched forth below and above  
Brahman, indeed, is this whole world, this widest extent.<sup>5</sup>

The reality of the universe is dependent on *brahman*. Although active and creator of the universe, He is most passive and unmoved. In some passages *ātman* is described negatively, but in a large number of passages we find positive description. Thus *ātman* is the inner-self, guide, knower and enjoyer of the fruit of actions. It is described as all pervasive and omnipresent.

In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* the *brahman* is described as Truth, Knowledge and Infinite (*satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ brahman*). This *brahman* dwells in the cavity or heart of each being.<sup>6</sup> The Upaniṣadic doctrine of *ātman* contains seeds of theistic as well as absolutistic ideas. Unlike Jainism, several Upaniṣadic passages teach the ultimate unity of all forms of life. We may say that in contradistinction to the Jaina theory of plurality of *ātman*s, the Upaniṣadic Vedānta teaches the unity of the *ātman*.

3. *Ibid.*, II, 6.

4. *Chāndōgya Upaniṣad*, IV, 10.5.

5. *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, II.2, 11, Eng.tr.by R.E. Hume.

6. *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, V.10,12; *Īśā Upaniṣad*, IV.5; *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, II.1.

## THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ

After the old Upaniṣads the most representative and authoritative text of Brahmanical theology is the *Bhagavadgītā*. It presents a remarkable synthesis of the diverse doctrines of Vedic and non- Vedic origin. The unity of the soul and God or *ātman* and *brahman* is taught in this text also. The *Bhagavadgītā* makes a clear distinction between the self or spirit and matter or the material world, although both these are traced to God. The words *brahman*, *puruṣa īśvara*, and the names Viṣṇu, Kṛṣṇa and Vāsudeva are used for God. On the other hand, the *ātman* is described as eternal, unborn, all-pervasive, ancient, unmanifest and unthinkable. It is immortal; it is neither born, nor does it die. This immortal self is declared identical with the Supreme Lord.<sup>7</sup> The tenet of the immortality of self is clearly stated in the following verse of the *Bhagavadgītā*:

Swords cut him not, fire burns him not,  
Water wets him not, wind dries him not...  
Eternal, omnipresent, fixed,  
immovable, everlasting is he  
(the human soul).<sup>8</sup>

Like the Sāṃkhya system, the *Bhagavadgītā* also makes a distinction between the soul and the body. The relationship between these two is compared to that between a person and his garments. The doctrine of rebirth is taken for granted. The embodied self undergoes the process of birth, death and rebirth. It is only in its embodied form that it is seen as a doer of deeds. Thus the Upaniṣadic doctrine of *ātman* is taught in the *Bhagavadgītā* also. But the impact of the Sāṃkhya thought on the *Bhagavadgītā* has resulted in a new synthesis of the Upaniṣadic doctrine of *brahman*, the Sāṃkhya doctrine of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* and Vaiṣṇava theology. The growth of the

7. *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 18, 20, 22.

7. *Ibid*, II.23-24. Eng. tr. by Franklin Edgerton.

theistic ideas and of *bhakti* perhaps inspired the doctrine of *mukti* through divine pleasure (*prasāda*). In the earlier parts of the text *karmayoga* is expounded as the highest way to liberation of the self. It is in this context that the *Bhagavadgītā* teaches meditation and renunciation of attachment. As we will see below this aspect of its teaching has considerable affinity with the Buddhist and Jaina pathways to liberation.

The early Brahmanical doctrine of *ātman* as found in the old Upaniṣads and the *Bhagavadgītā* gave rise to different interpretations during the age of the systems. Thus the Advaita Vedānta represented by Śaṅkara taught the absolutistic notion of *ātman*, whereas the viśistādvaita Vedānta represented by Rāmanuja taught the theistic notion of *ātman*. In Advaita Vedānta the *ātman* or *brahman* is accepted as the only ultimate reality; the phenomenal world is described as *māyā*. In this system ignorance (*avidyā*) is assumed as the cause of bondage. Liberation (*mōkṣa*) consists in knowing the identity of *ātman* and *brahman*. In his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* Śaṅkara seeks to establish the view that the real self (*ātman*) is identical with the supreme self or Lord (*parameśvara*). The real and transcendental self, according to him, does not transmigrate. The embodied being (*jīva*) who appears as the doer of deeds and enjoyer of fruits is not identical with the Lord.<sup>8a</sup> In his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, Śaṅkara interprets this text in accordance with the

Advaita doctrine. The *Bhagavadgītā* itself, however, teaches theistic Vedānta. In many verses a clear distinction is made between individual self and the Universal self or God. The path leading to liberation does not consist exclusively of knowledge (*jñāna*). Actions (*karma*) dedicated to God and performed without any attachment to their fruits as well as loving devotion (*bhakti*) to God are equally valid paths to the ultimate goal according to the *Bhagavadgītā*.

8a. *Brahmasūtra-Saṅkarabhāṣya*, 1.i.17.

## THE SĀṂKHYA YOGA

Although originally of non-Vedic *Śramaṇic* origin, the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems of thought in the course of time came to be included within the 'six stand-points' (*ṣaḍdarśana*) of the Brahmanical philosophy. Both these philosophies are non-theistic. Although God (*Īśvara*) is mentioned in the *Yogasūtra*, He is not central to the Yoga system of thought. The doctrinal framework of the Yoga system does not differ to any great extent from that of the Sāṅkhya. On the other hand, the technique of liberation envisaged in the Sāṅkhya is identical with that of the Yoga. Hence the two systems are often treated together.

The Sāṅkhya system is not only non-theistic but also dualistic. It teaches a clear dualism between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. It does not recognize the existence of God. It acknowledges the existence of numerous 'persons' or 'selves' (*puruṣas*). *Prakṛti* and *puruṣa* are eternal realities. *Puruṣa* is understood as the self or the conscious principle. It is different from body, mind, senses and other elements. It is of the nature of consciousness, the knower and the pure subject. The real *puruṣa* is timeless, changeless, and the self-luminous. This is true of all the different *puruṣas*. Like Buddhism, Jainism, and the Yoga, the point of departure in the Sāṅkhya is the suffering of the earthly existence. It seeks to expound a way leading to freedom from suffering. The cause of bondage is the contact between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. It must be mentioned that according to the Sāṅkhya it is the Ego, the product of *Prakṛti*, which is in bondage. The real *puruṣa* is beyond bondage. The knowledge of the discrimination between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* is essential for achieving liberation. According to Īśvarakṛṣṇa bondage and liberation belong to *prakṛti* in its different forms. The *puruṣa* or self in its essential nature is transcendental and indescribable.

The Yoga concept of the self is also pluralistic. The *puruṣa* according to the Yoga system, is eternal and self-luminous. He is not dependent on God. Bondage of the self is due to ignorance; liberation is achieved by the discriminative knowledge of the essential nature of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. In the *Bhagavadgītā* Sāṅkhya and Yoga doctrine are woven around a theistic Vedānta. The characteristically Yoga conception of the self is to be found in the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali.

## THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF NOT-SELF

Buddhism differs from all other systems of Indian thought in its attitude to the notion of self or soul. One of its cardinal teachings is the doctrine of not-self (*anātmavāda*). Buddhism has taught that there exists no permanent entity which can be identified with what is called the self. The belief in the existence of an eternal and substantial self is regarded as a 'false view' (*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*) by the Buddhists.

The three great characteristics which characterize all the phenomena are, impermanence (*anitya*), suffering (*duḥkha*) and not-self (*anātma*). We read in the *Dhammapada* :

"All conditioned things are impermanent, all conditioned things are suffering; and all phenomenal things are not-self."<sup>9</sup>

The word 'conditioned' here means dependent on causes (*hetu*) and conditions (*pratyaya*). The doctrine of conditioned co-production (*pratīyasamutpāda*) is a universal law of causation which, according to Buddhism, relentlessly operates in the whole universe. All the 'things' (*dharma*s) are governed by this law. This interdependence or conditionedness of things and created objects makes it impossible for anything to have its 'own-nature' (*svabhāva*) or 'self-existence' (*ātmabhāva*). The Buddhist dictum teaches that 'whatsoever is a rising thing, that is a ceasing thing'. In other words, all those things that are produced by causes or originate dependently, they are lacking

9. *The Dhammapada* verses 277-279. Eng. tr. by L.M. Joshi.

in self-nature or self-hood. To seek for an eternal self in this realm of causally related and changing phenomena is a missearch or wrong effort.

The Buddha analysed the human personality and taught that it is an aggregate of five groups. These groups are called *skandhas*, literally 'groups', 'heaps', or 'aggregates'. They are:

1. *rūpa*, material form or body;
2. *vedanā*, feeling;
3. *saṃjñā*, perception;
4. *saṃskāra*, volitional forces; and
5. *viññāna*, consciousness.

Of these, the first, *rūpa-skandha*, stands for the physical and the remaining four *skandhas* are the psychological components of the personality (*pudgala*). The Buddha pointed out that one could not find an *ātman* or one's 'self' in any of these *skandhas*. He further pointed out that all these *skandhas* or constituents of human personality are impermanent because they are conditioned. They are also of the nature of suffering, because they are impermanent and conditioned. That which is impermanent, conditioned and of the nature of suffering cannot be my 'self' or anything 'mine' or 'belonging to me'. The belief in the reality of an endurable *ātman* has been consistently criticised by the Buddhist philosophers from the time of the Buddha to that of Śāntaraksita (eighth century AD). It may be mentioned in passing that a sect of Buddhism, that of the Vātsīputriyaṣ or Pudgalavādins, is known to have believed in the existence of *pudgala*, perhaps a kind of 'self', which according to them was neither identical with nor different from the *skandhas*.<sup>10</sup> Most schools of Buddhism, however, have treated this sect as heretical, because the tenet of an indescribable *pudgala* or 'person' ran counter to the central current of Buddhist thought.

10. *See Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntaraksita, verses 336-449.

Some modern scholars including Swami Vivekānanda, Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Ananda Coomaraswamy, Radhakrishnan and others have asserted that the Buddha did not deny the reality of an ultimate Self. His disciples, however, have denied the existence of self

altogether and insisted upon the *anātman* theory. Scholars who seek to harmonize the teachings of the Buddha and those of early Upaniṣads, have resorted to this view that original Buddhism believed in the existence of *ātman*.

But several other scholars including E. Conze and T.R.V. Murti, have rightly pointed out that such a doctrine requires the rejection of the early Buddhist doctrine as known to us from the Pali Canon for which there is neither evidence nor justification. The central Buddhist tradition has consistently taught the doctrine of not-self and the Buddhist philosophers eulogised this doctrine as an outstanding characteristic of Buddha's teachings. *Anātmavāda*, however radical and startling it might appear to us, has remained a fundamental theoretical basis of the Buddhist technique of liberation.

In conclusion to this brief discussion of the Buddhist attitude to the idea of *ātman* we may refer to the views of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, two of the greatest masters of Mahāyāna thought. Nāgārjuna has said in one of the crucial verses of his *Mādhyamakaśāstra*<sup>11</sup> that the Buddha has taught self (*ātman*) as well as not-self (*anātman*): but he has also taught neither self (*ātman*) nor not-self (*anātman*) whatsoever. Candrakīrti in his commentary on this verse points out that Lord Buddha, out of great compassion, taught the existence of *ātman* to those men of perverted views who did not believe in the existence of this world, the other world, the law of *karma*, and were thus given to nihilism. In order to save them from going to perdition, he expounded the existence of self. For

11. *Mādhyamakaśāstra* with commentary of Candrakīrti, XVIII.6-  
Ātmetyapi prajñāpitamanātmetyapi deśitam/  
Buddhairnātma na cānātmā kaścidityapi deśitam//

benefit of such beings as are devoted to virtuous deeds and find it difficult to get out of the round of birth and death because of the *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* or the view that the personality is real and the self is durable, he taught the doctrine of not-self so that desire for *nirvāṇa* could be developed in their hearts. Finally he taught neither the existence of self nor the existence of not-self whatever to those excellent disciples in whom self-love had died down and who were sufficiently advanced in the spiritual path and were capable of penetrating into the Buddha's profound teachings. This means that from the ultimate standpoint there is neither self nor not-self in *nirvāṇa*.

### THE DOCTRINE OF SELF IN JAINISM

The word *jīva* or *ātman* is commonly used for self or soul in Jainism, though several other words, like *prāṇī*, *bhūta*, *sattva*, *vijñā*, *veda*, *ceta*, *jeta*, etc.,<sup>12</sup> occasionally occur expressing the same meaning. Jainism recognizes *jīva* or self as an eternal entity. The defining characteristic of self is sentiency, and hence it is different from the material objects. Self is regarded as beginningless and as having unending continuous existence. It has neither a beginning nor an end; it is an entity which lived in the past and which continues to live in the present, and which will certainly live in future too. Though it cannot be perceived, yet it has some manifest features in this mundane existence. The manifest and essential features are its life-essentials (such as *indriya* or senses, *bala* or the channels of activities, *āyu* or life-duration and *śvāsocchvāsa* or respiration) which are the signs of its presence in an embodied condition.<sup>13</sup>

To understand the concept of self, it is necessary to know first what is not-self, because the ontological analysis of reals, according to Jaina philosophy, undertakes both self (*jīva*) and not-self (*ajīva*) into consideration which cover up the entire

12. See *Bhagavatisūtra*, Eng.tr.by Lalwani, vol.II,p.179.
13. *Pravacanasāra*, 11.55; Pañcāstikāya, 30.

the psychological and physical phenomena of the universe.

### NOT-SELF (AJĪVA)

*Ajīva* or not-self has been explained by Jaina scholars as non-psychical entity, different from *jīva* or self whose essential characteristic is sentiency.<sup>14</sup> By calling *ajīva* as not-self, non-self, non-psychical or non-sentient, it does not mean that it stands only for matter or physical body having some form, because its classification includes those substances also which have no forms. The substances that come under this category are (1) *PUDGALA*, (2) *DHARMA*, (3) *ADHARMA*, (4) *ĀKĀSA* and (5) *KĀLA*

(1) The term *PUDGALA* refers to the substance which has some form. Literally it stands for the material substance which undergoes modifications, combinations and dissociations. Due to combination the extent of *pudgala* is some times increased, while due to dissociation its extent is sometimes decreased. As it has a peculiar process of combination (*pud*) and dissociation (*gala*), it is called *pudgala*.<sup>15</sup> It has been defined as having the characteristics of touch (*sparśa*), taste (*rasa*), smell (*gandha*) and colour (*varṇa*),<sup>16</sup> which are also accepted by other systems of Indian thought as inherent attributes of matter. But Jain philosophers do not maintain that sound (*dhvani*) is also a characteristic of matter. They accept it as a mode of matter.<sup>17</sup>

The forms of *pudgala* or matter are chiefly two, viz.: indivisible elementary particles which are known as *aṇus* or *paramāṇus* or atoms, and the aggregates of these particles which are known as *skandhas* or aggregates or combinations.<sup>18</sup> *Aṇus* or *paramāṇus* are subtle and imperceptible, as these are the

14. *Saravāthasiddhi* 1.4; *tad viparyāya lakṣaṇo ajīvah*; *Pravacanasāra*, 11.35; *Dravyasaṃgraha tīkā* on 15.
15. *Tattvārthasūtra*, V.5, *rūpinah pudgalah*; *Tattvārtharājavārtika*, IV.1; *Dravyasaṃgraha-tīkā* on 15,26; *Niyamasāra-vṛtti* on 9; *Tattvārthasāra*, III.55.
16. *Tattvārthasūtra* V.23; *Vyākhyāprajñapti*, XII.5.450.
17. H.S. Bhattāchārya: *Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics*, p.119.
18. *Tattvārthasūtra*, V.25;

smallest indivisible material particles, though the contractual relation between sense- organs and atoms is always possible as touch, taste, smell and colour, the physical attributes, are always associated with the atoms. But the properties of hardness or softness and heaviness or lightness are not associated with atoms. These are the properties of the combinations or aggregates of atoms which are known as *skandhas*. The *skandhas* have gross forms and are subject to the process of association and dissociation.<sup>19</sup> *Skandhas* having gross forms do not mean that these are always perceptible. Some times some *skandhas* are imperceptible,<sup>20</sup> but become perceptible by the combined process of association and dissociation. For example, the *skandhas* of hydrogen and chlorine gases are imperceptible, but when each of them breaks and then combines the result becomes perceptible.<sup>21</sup>

The *skandha* is, however, an all round complete gross form (*sayalasarāmattham*)<sup>22</sup> of the aggregate of atoms and has the material qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour being explicitly manifested. It is said to be capable of existing in any of the six forms viz; (a) *sthūla-sthūla* (solid form like earth, stone etc.) (b) *sthūla* (liquid form like ghee, water, oil etc.) (c) *sthūla-sūkṣma* (small particle, capable of being perceived, (d) *sūkṣma-sthūla* (substance, appearing as solid), (e) *sūkṣma* (particle so small as to be imperceptible) and (f) *sūkṣma-sūkṣma* or *ati-sūkṣma* (an extremely small particle).<sup>23</sup> The first four, of course, have gross forms and are perceptible, while the last two are not at all perceptible. The *karma-pudgalas* or *karmic* particles, in the condition of being bound up with self are *sūkṣma*.

Regarding the nature of accommodation of *pudgalas* or

19. *Tattvārthasūtra*, V.26; 20. *Ibid.*, V.28.

21. See M.L. Mehta, *Jaina Philosophy*, p.121.

22. *Gommaṣāsāra: Jivakāṇḍa*, 604.

23. *Niyamasāra*.21-24; *Gommaṣāsāra, Jivakāṇḍa*, 603.

material substances; it is said that these occupy one unit of space onwards to the infinite space-points according to their forms.<sup>24</sup> Only an elementary indivisible particle (*aṇu* or *Paramāṇu*) occupies one unit of space. Similarly *skandhas* or aggregates of atoms occupy space-points according to their combination of atoms, that means they occupy countable or countless space-points of the universe-space (*lokākāśa*) which is filled with infinite forms of matter of subtle and gross nature.<sup>25</sup>

Now a question arises as to how a material substance which is a combination of atoms takes its form. Really the atomic particles cannot unite in a random way. There is a system and that is based on the properties of smoothness (*snigdha*) and roughness (*rūkṣa*) which are associated with those atomic particles.<sup>26</sup> In the process of their combination the degrees of the properties of atomic particles work. The combination between the lowest degrees of these two properties is not possible.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, the atomic particles with equal degrees of smoothness or roughness and of the same kind also do not unite with an atom of their own kind.<sup>28</sup> But the combination between degrees different by two units is possible.<sup>29</sup> In this process the higher degrees transform the lower ones.<sup>30</sup> and hence material substance takes its shape.

(2-3) *DHARMA* and *ADHARMA* are the conditions or media of motion and rest, which assist motion and rest, respectively.<sup>31</sup> These two are non-active (*niṣkriya*) or passive conditions (*upagrāhaka*) because these help to create conditions or movement and rest. It cannot be said that *dharma* originates motion and *adharmas* stops it. Though *dharma* does not generate motion, yet its presence is an essential condition for the movement (*gamanasahayāri*) of *jīvas* and *pudgalas*;

24. *Tattvārthasūtra*, V.14;

25. *Saravārthasiddhi*, V.14

26. *Tattvārthasūtra*, V.33.

27. *Ibid.*, V.34.

28. *Ibid.*, V.35.

29. *Ibid.*, V.36.

30. *Ibid.*, V.37.

31. *Ibid.*, V.17.

it helps their movement just as water helps the movement of fish by its mere presence.<sup>32</sup> Likewise *adharmas* also does not persuade *jīvas* and *pudgalas* to rest, but helps them to rest (*thāṇasahayāri*), being a passive condition for a traveller's rest under it.<sup>33</sup> It does not mean that some agencies outside the substances are causing their motion and rest. Motion and rest



constitute *sans doute* the inherent nature of substances, but some auxiliary conditions do work in their movement and rest, and these are *dharma* and *adharmā*. As a fish has the capacity to move, but water helps in its movement.

Regarding the existence of these two substances, it is maintained that these two pervade the entire universe-space (*lokākāśa*)<sup>34</sup> without leaving any inter-space as oil in the sesame seeds.<sup>35</sup> They thus occupy innumerable space-points.<sup>36</sup> They are eternally existent (*nitya*) in the universe-space and are fixed as the sole constituents of the universe (*avasthita*). The *dharma* and *adharmā* are cosmic realities, having no form (*arūpi*).

(4) *ĀKĀŚA* or space is understood to make room for things and to be the receptacle for all substances.<sup>37</sup> That which gives a space or *avagāha* to all things is known as *ākāśa*. It accommodates selves, matter, the conditions or media of motion and rest, and time.<sup>38</sup> It is the base or support to accommodate all the things, but at the same time it is also its base or support. It is an eternal real, but its nature is formless,<sup>39</sup> and its extension is infinite<sup>40</sup> It is infinite because its *pradeśas* or subtle parts are infinite in number. Each *pradeśa* can accommodate at least one indivisible atomic particle (*aṇu*) of *dharma*, *adharmā*, *jīva* and *kāla*.

32. *Dravyasaṃgraha*, 17.      33. *Dravyasaṃgraha*, 18.  
 34. *Tattvārthasūtra*, V.13.      35. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, V.13.  
 36. *Tattvārthasūtra*, V.8; *Sthānaṅgasūtra*, IV.3.334.  
 37. *Tattvārthasūtra*, V.18.      38. *Pañcāstikāya*, 90; *Dravyasaṃgraha*, 19.  
 39. *Tattvārthasūtra*, V.4-6.      40. *Ibid.*, V.9.

*Ākāśa* is divided under two heads, viz., *lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa*.<sup>41</sup> *Lokākāśa*, accommodates all the five substances mentioned above,<sup>42</sup> but the specific properties of those substances are not lost. *Alokākāśa* means empty space where none of the five substances resides.

(5) *KĀLA* or time is also real because it helps in perceiving change and motion. It is divided into real time (*niścayakāla*) and relative time (*vyavahārakāla*). The real time is a substance according to Jaina philosophy, the characteristic of which is *vartanā*,<sup>43</sup> meaning the gradual change that occurs in substances due to the auxiliary cause of real time. The functions of time are to assist substances in their continuity, in their modifications, in their movements and in their priority and non-priority in time.<sup>44</sup> The relative time is not regarded as a substance, because it is simply a measure of duration, as one second, one minute, one hour, etc.

Thus the above mentioned five categories of the *ajīvatattva* are non-psychical substances. Only *jīva*, according to Jaina philosophy, is psychical, to which we now turn our attention.

### EXISTENCE OF THE SELF (ĀTMAN)

Regarding the existence of the self, it is often argued that the self is non-existent like a flower in the sky because it is not directly perceived as is the case with a *ghaṭa* or pitcher. In reply to this it is said that the self can indeed be directly perceived by one, because one's knowledge about it which consists of doubts etc., is itself the self. And what is directly experienced needs no other proof, such as pleasure and pain of the body.<sup>45</sup>

41. *Dravyasaṃgraha*, 19.  
 42. *Tattvārthasūtra*, V.12; *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*, XXVIII. 7; *Vyākhyāprajñapti*, II.10.121-22.  
 43. *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*, XXVIII.10, *vattanā lakhano kālo*.

44. Tattvārthasūtra, V.22, *Vartanāparinamakriyāḥ paratvāparatva ca kālasya*.  
 45. *Gaṇadharaṇvāda*, verse 6.

The doubt about the existence of self presupposes its existence. Even if we doubt every item of our experience, the act of doubt cannot be denied. It reminds us of the famous dictum of Descartes, *cogito ergo sum*, i.e., "I think therefore I am", which is based on this principle of doubt because thought exists, therefore the self exists. It is a proposition which emphasizes the relation between a substance and its qualities. Descartes asserts that a thinking self is an absolute certainty whose reality cannot be doubted at all, because self is a substance whose essential attribute is thought.

A substance is known through its qualities. A substance and its qualities are co-existent. If the qualities are experienced, it means that the substance exists. *Jīva* or self is also a substance, and its qualities like perception, intuition etc., are objects of our experience. Therefore *jīva* or self exists.

The existence of the self is justifiable also on the ground that the self is endowed with qualities (*guṇin*). The *guṇas* of the self are remembrance (*smṛti*), desire for knowledge (*jijñāsā*), desire for activity (*cikīrsā*), desire for movements (*jigamiṣā*) and doubt (*saṁśaya*) etc. These are self-evident, for they are realized by oneself. Hence the self, a *guṇin*, is also self-evident.<sup>46</sup>

Furthermore, the existence of self can be proved on the ground that the *jīva* in itself is pure (*śuddha*) like the sky.<sup>47</sup> This self is independent, super-sensual, devoid of mind, body and speech; if one concentrates upon it by oneself then one can attain liberation.<sup>48</sup>

### THE NATURE OF SELF

Every self is a conscious, doer, dynamic agent of actions and direct enjoyer. It is the living principle which corresponds

46. *Gaṇadharaṇvāda*, verse 10.

47. *Yogasāra of Yogīndra*, verse 58; see Śital Prasād: *A Comparative Study of Buddhism and Jainism*, p.87.

48. *Yogasāra*, verse 85.

to the life element or *elan vital* of Bergson's thought. Each self is a separate entity. It is eternal, uncreated, immaterial, incorporeal and beyond the range of physical vision. It is a simple unit, capable of fully realising in and for itself full freedom and perfection.

The existence of the self is tacitly assumed in Jainism. It is believed to be beginningless and endless. In other words it is indestructible and eternal. The *jīva* in *saṁsāra* is not different from the body. This embodied being is, however, quite different from the real self. In other words, self is different from the body. From the standpoint of time the self is viewed as existing in all three periods of time past, present, and future. Like time (*kāla*), the self (*ātman*) is also believed to be without beginning and without end. The self is sometimes compared to the sky. Like the sky it is formless. The self is the foundation of knowledge and other virtues.

The Jaina view of self is substantial. It can assume different forms and names in different states of existence (*gati*) but its substantial nature remains unchanged just as gold remains gold in different ornaments made of gold. It has been stated in the *Samayasāra* that :

"Whatever is produced from a substance, has the same attributes as those of the substance. Know ye, certainly they cannot be different, just as bangles, etc. made of gold cannot be other than gold".<sup>49</sup>

The self is a dynamic entity in sense that it is the doer of deeds and enjoyer of their fruits. Another feature of self is its luminosity. It illuminates the body in which it dwells. A most important characteristic of the self is knowledge (*jñāna*). The *Ācāraṅgasūtra* teaches as follows:

"The self is the knower (or experiencer), and the

49. *Samayasāra*, verse 308.

50. *Ācāraṅgasūtra*, 1.5.5; SBE, vol.XXII, p.50.

knower is the self. That through which one knows is the self. With regard to this (to know) it (the self) is established. Such is he who maintains the right doctrine of self."<sup>50</sup>

Kundakunda in his *pravacanasāra* expounds the view that the self is subject to *Pariṇāma*, 'change' or 'transformation'. This reminds us of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of transformation. According to the Sāṃkhya theory the physical as well as mental world is a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of *prakṛti*, the primordial matter. In *Vijñānavāda* also a kind of *pariṇāmavāda* or theory of transformation, which is radically different from the above, is found. Thus Vasubandhu in his *Triṃśikā* describes this whole world as a triple process of transformation of consciousness (*vijñānapariṇāma*) into *ālayavijñāna*, *manōvijñāna* and *pravṛttivijñāna*.<sup>51</sup> According to Kundakunda the self is subject to transformation with regard to knowledge, action and fruit; therefore the self should be understood as consisting of knowledge (*jñāna*), action (*karma*) and fruit (*phala*).<sup>52</sup> In the next verse the author says that a *śramaṇa* realizes the pure self when he knows that the self alone is the agent, the instrument, the deed and the fruit; such an ascetic becomes free from passions.<sup>53</sup> According to Kundakunda the self is without material forms and colour but it perceives and knows material forms and colours and their qualities also.<sup>54</sup> This does not however mean that the essential nature of the self is involved in actions like perception etc. Kundakunda says that it is the states of consciousness which are influenced by passions and therefore are involved in action:

"The self effects the transformation of its consciousness and is directly responsible for the transformation; it is not the agent of all those conditions that constitute the material substances and their

51. *Vijñāptimātratasiddhi*, verse 17.

52. *Pravacanasāra*, II.33.

53. *Ibid.*, II.34. 54. *Ibid.*, II.82.

transformations. In reality the self is never an agent of material *karmas*, it neither accepts nor rejects them, although it is always present in the midst of matter".<sup>55</sup>

This and such other statements of Kundakunda, however, are to be understood in the light of his exposition of *vyavahāra-naya* and *niścaya-naya*.

It would not be incorrect to say that the freedom of the will of an individual self is tacitly accepted in Jaina philosophy. The self is, therefore, the maker of its own destiny. It has been declared in the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*:

"My own self is the river Vaitarani, my own self the Sālamāli tree; my own self is the miraculous cow Kāmadhenu, my own self the park Nandana. My own self is the doer and undoer of misery and happiness, my own self, friend and foe according as I act well or badly".<sup>56</sup>

This notion of moral responsibility of an individual self for each of its actions belongs to the common heritage of Indian religious thought.

That the ultimate release is obtained by the self through its own efforts, is taught in the Jaina Canon at several places.

"The body is the boat, the self is the boatman, and the realm of transmigration (*samsāra*) is the ocean which is crossed by the great sages".<sup>57</sup>

Two other verses in the *Uttarādhyayanasūtra* stress the same teaching:

"Subdue yourself, for the self is difficult to subdue, if yourself is subdued, you will be happy in this world and in the next. Better it is that I should subdue myself by life

55. *Pravacanasāra*, II.92-93.

56. *Uttarādhyayanasūtra*, XX.36-37;SBE, vol.XLV,p.104.

57. *Uttarādhyayanasūtra*, XXIII.73.

self-control and penance, than be subdued by others with fetters and corporal punishment".<sup>58</sup>

The Jaina teaching is in perfect agreement with this ideal. We read the following in the *Uttarādhyayanasūtra*:

"Though a man should conquer thousands and thousands of valiant (foes), greater will be his victory if he conquers nobody but himself".<sup>59</sup>

The Jaina scriptures dwell at length over the nature of the self. Describing the immateriality and eternity of the self the *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* declares :

"(The soul) cannot be apprehended by the senses, because it possesses no corporeal form, and since it possesses no corporeal form it is eternal. The fetter of the soul has been ascertained to be caused by its bad qualities, and this fetter is called the cause of worldly existence."<sup>60</sup>

The doctrine of transmigration of selves is one of the basic strands of the Jaina ideology. Along with the idea of transmigration we find that the moral law of rewards and punishments is also a basic element in the system. In a passage of the *Ācārāṅgasūtra* the believer in the self is described as believer in the world, a believer in the *karma* and a believer in the activity.<sup>61</sup>

### CLASSIFICATION OF SELVES

It is well known that Jainism is a pluralistic system and teaches the reality of an infinite number of selves. This view is radically different from the monistic Vēdānta doctrine of the reality of one absolute self. Jainism rejects the notion of one absolute self and believes in the plurality of selves. The

58. *Ibid.*, I.15-16;SBE, vol.XLV,p.3.

59. *Uttarādhyayanasūtra*, IX.34; SBE, vol.XLV,p.38.

60. *Ibid.*, XIV.19.

61. *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, I.1.5-6.

principle or *jīva* is recognized even in earth, water and plants etc. In short the entire cosmos is filled with selves.

Some texts divide the multitude of selves into two classes, *pariyāpta* and *apariyāpta*, completely developed and incompletely developed. The *jīvakāṇḍa* section of the *Gommaṭasāra*<sup>62</sup> states that these two classes of beings can be further subdivided according to their physical and mental faculties so as to make fourteen classes in all. The selves which have the capacity of completely developing instantly the characteristics of the body which they are going to assume in the course of rebirth are called *pariyāpta*. The bodily characteristics include mental and physical organs of the senses. The selves which do not have the aforesaid capacity are called *apariyāpta*.

According to Jainism, the *jīvas* are infinite in number and each *jīva* is different from other. One never becomes another or absorbs another. Every self is proportionate with the body it occupies. The mundane self is capable of adjusting its size according to its body as light illuminates a large or small space of room. The self exists in the body due to its material vitalities (*dravyaprāṇas*). They are of five senses namely, smell, sight, hearing, taste and touch; three powers of body, mind, speech and body; age and breathing. They are ten in number and are found in different degrees according to the kinds of selves.<sup>63</sup> This is the phenomenal aspect of self.

The *Tattvārthasāra* enumerates a tenfold classification of beings in the following manner:

The *jīva* is of one kind from the standpoint of its common essence which is the life principle. It is of two kinds according as it is liberated or in bondage. It can be of three kinds: imperfect, nearly perfect, and perfect. With respect to its state

62. *Gommaṭasāra*, *Jīvakāṇḍa*, verse 72.

63. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, verse 30.

of existence the *jīva* is divided into four classes namely, hellish- existence, sub-human-existence, human-existence and divine- existence. The *jīva* is of five kinds according to its five conditions namely, mitigation, annihilation, partial annihilation and partial mitigation, modification and genesis or rising. The six modes of cognition divide the *jīva* into six classes. A sevenfold hypothetical classification of beings based on the principle of *saptabhāṅginaya* yields seven classes of *jīva*. The eight modes of *karma* yield eight classes of *jīva*. The nine categories make the *jīva* of nine kinds. Finally ten classes of *jīva* are mentioned; this tenfold classification is based on ten faculties mentioned above.<sup>64</sup>

The *Tattvārthasūtra* in its second chapter gives a different kind of classification of *jīvas*. It says that three fundamental characteristics are found only in *jīva*; they are not found in other substances. These three are the principle of life (*jīvatva*), capacity for liberation (*bhavyatva*) and the absence of capacity for liberation (*abhavyatva*). These essentials are peculiar to *ātman*. This text describes consciousness as the characteristic of self (*upayogo lakṣaṇam*). The word *upayōga* is defined as that which is co-existent with the principle of

awareness or consciousness (*cetanā*) and is caused by both internal and external conditions. It is the distinction of self and differentiates the latter from the body. The *Upayoga* or consciousness is of two kinds. Of these two kinds the first is subdivided into eight forms while the latter is sub- divided into four forms.<sup>65</sup> According to the commentary of Pūjyapāda the sub-divisions are as follows:

The first division of consciousness is into knowledge and perception (*jñāna* and *darśana*). Knowledge is of following

64. *Tattvārthasāra*, 234-237. For detailed discussion of classification of ten kinds of *jīva*, see H.S. Bhattāchārya: *Reals in Jaina Metaphysics*, pp.290-362.

65. *Tattvārthasūtra*, II, 7-9; *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra*, XXVIII.10.

eight kinds: sensory knowledge, scriptural knowledge, clairvoyance, telepathy, omniscience, wrong sensory knowledge, wrong scriptural knowledge and wrong clairvoyance. Perception is of the following four kinds: perception through the eyes, perception by the senses other than the eyes, clairvoyant perception and omniscient perception.<sup>66</sup>

This classification shows that knowledge is an essential attribute of the self. Consciousness manifests itself through knowledge and vision. Knowledge comprehends the reality of the nature which is both universal and particular. Vision or *darśana* comprehends the reality of the self. It should be observed that *jñāna* reveals the external reality whereas *darśana* reveals the internal reality. From the ultimate standpoint both knowledge and vision or *jñāna* and *darśana* are identical with the self. When the self knows external reality we have *jñāna*; when the self has a vision of itself we have *darśana*. In this way *jñāna* and *darśana* both are attributes of the *ātman* just as heat and illumination both are attributes of the fire.<sup>67</sup>

An obvious classification of living beings into two classes distinguishes the liberated beings from those in the course of transmigration; the former are called *mukta* while the latter *saṃsārīn*.<sup>68</sup> The beings in the course of transmigration are of two kinds, mobile (*trasa*) and immobile (*sthāvāra*). The mobile beings are further classified into four types, those with two sense-organs, those with three sense-organs, those with four-sense organs and those with five sense-organs. The immobile are endowed only with one sense-organ; they are divided into five groups namely, the earth- bodied, the water-bodied, the fire-bodied, the air-bodied, and the plants. The beings of this

66. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, II.9; S.A. Jain: *Reality*, pp.55-56.

67. *Dravyasaṃgraha* with *vṛtti* on verse 44, (pp.171-72 of Agas edn).

68. *Tattvārthasūtra*, II.10; *Sthānamgasūtra*. II.I,57.

group have only one sense organ, that of contact. According to the Jaina view even this sense- organ is covered by a thick veil of ignorance.<sup>69</sup>

In the *jīvakāṇḍa* section of the *Gommaṭasāra* we have a list of fourteen *maggaṇās* or 'soul-quests'. The word *maggaṇā*, Sanskrit *mārgaṇā*, means investigation, quest or search. The selves are investigated in their various aspects which are fourteen in number. They are as follows:

1. state of existence (*gati*)
2. sense (*indriya*)

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 3. body ( <i>kāyā</i> )                             | 4. vibratory activity ( <i>yoga</i> )           |
| 5. sex-inclination ( <i>veda</i> )                  | 6. passion ( <i>kaṣāya</i> )                    |
| 7. knowledge ( <i>jñāna</i> )                       | 8. control ( <i>saṁyama</i> )                   |
| 9. perceptual vision ( <i>darśana</i> )             | 10. colouration ( <i>leśyā</i> )                |
| 11. capacity for liberation<br>( <i>bhavyatva</i> ) | 12. right belief ( <i>saṁyaktva</i> )           |
| 13. rationality ( <i>saṁjñatva</i> )                | 14. assimilation ( <i>āhāra</i> ) <sup>70</sup> |

In several Jaina texts three forms of the self are distinguished:

1. The external self (*bahirātman*),
2. Internal self (*antarātman*) and
3. Highest self (*paramātman*).<sup>71</sup>

The external self, out of ignorance and attachment, takes the body for the self. It says "I am the body and the physical objects are mine". This identification of the self with the gross physical body and external objects is a positive hindrance to spiritual enlightenment and liberation.

The internal self, that is, mind, is aware of the difference between the self and not-self. It knows that the self is the supreme reality, free from objectivity and untouched by

69. *Pañcāstikāyaśāra*, 109-10; *Tattvārthasūtra*, II. 12-14; *Sthānaṅgasūtra*, V.1.394.  
70. *Gommaśāra-jivakāṇḍa*, verse 142.  
71. *Paramātmaprakāśa*, I. 12-14; *Samayasāra*, verse 25; *Samādhitāntra*, 7.11-13.

sense-enjoyments. In this form the self as a spiritual entity is free from lust and attachment and is on the way to liberation.<sup>72</sup>

This internal self becomes the supreme self when it knows its real nature, full of knowledge and devoid of all *karmas*.<sup>73</sup> We read in the *Samayasāra* the following description of the one who has the knowledge of *paramātman*:

"I am unique in as much as I am of the nature of *upayoga*; hence no delusion whatsoever is related to me. He who thinks like this, the knowers of the true self call him free from delusion."<sup>74</sup>

The word *paramātman* denotes the real and ultimate form of the supreme self which is pure, perfect and luminous. Such a self is called *siddha* or perfected. He is the knower of all and conqueror of passions.<sup>75</sup> In the *Tattvārthasāra* he is described as perfect, pure, eternal, free from *karmas* and of the nature of knowledge. This concept of self as *siddha* represents the climax of Jaina ideology. To attain the state of *paramātman* is the highest goal according to Jainism. This same state is known as liberation (*mokṣa*).

Kundakunda has briefly discussed the doctrine of two standpoints: practical standpoint and the pure standpoint. The practical standpoint is called *vyavahāranaya* while the pure standpoint is called *Śuddhanaya*. Reality is known through the pure standpoint; the practical standpoint does not reveal the real; the self which takes refuge in the real standpoint has the right vision. Those who are satisfied with the lower status of existence adopt the pure standpoint which reveals the supreme existence.<sup>76</sup>

The doctrine of two truths that is found in Buddhism<sup>77</sup>

72. *Samādhitāntra*, verses 15,27,30,37.

73. *Paramātmaprakāśa* I.15; *Mokṣapāhuda*, verse 5. 74. *Samayasāra*, verse 36.

75. *Mokṣapāhuda*, verse 35.76. *Samayasāra* I.11-12.

77. For the Buddhist theory of *saṃvṛttisatya* and *paramārthasatya* see *Madhyamakasāstra*, XXIV, 8-10.

appears to have influenced the Jaina theory of two standpoints as explained by Kundakunda. Nāgārjuna flourished earlier than Kundakunda. Kundakunda makes use of the theory of two standpoints with a view to illuminating the Jaina doctrine that the knowledge of the supreme self alone constitutes the pure standpoint. He says:

"He who perceives the self as not bound, untouched, and not other than itself; fixed or steady, undifferentiated and unattached, know him as possessed of pure standpoint".<sup>78</sup>

### SELF, CONSCIOUSNESS AND MIND

The Jaina philosophers have described consciousness as the fundamental characteristic of life (*jīva* or *ātman*). The Jaina texts have used two words, *upayoga* and *cetanā*, in the sense of consciousness. The *Tattvārthasūtra* (II.8) describes the self as characterised by *upayoga*. This word means that which is functional, that which can serve a function. This function according to *Gommaṣasāra-Jivakāṇḍa* (verse-672) is to grasp the knowledge of objects. In other words, the main function of consciousness is knowledge. *Upayoga* is of two kinds: with form and without form. The formless *upayoga* is understood as *darśana* or vision whereas the *upayoga* with form is the cognition of the objects; it is called *jñāna*. Thus *jñāna* and *darśana* are the two aspects of consciousness.

The Jaina view of consciousness suggests some remarkable theories of modern psychology. Consciousness (*cetanā*), according to Jainism stands for (1) the passive experience of agreeable or disagreeable phenomena, (2) the consciousness of purposive activity and (3) the more complicated psychical state, associated with or rather leading to pure knowledge.<sup>79</sup>

Sometimes a distinction is made between *cetanā* and

78. *Samayasāra*, I.14.

79. See H.S. Bhattāchārya: *Reals in Jaina Metaphysics*, p.293.

*upayoga*. The former is understood as consciousness while the latter serves the function of consciousness.<sup>80</sup>

T.G. Kalghatgi has pointed out that the Jaina thinkers were aware of unconscious state. He cites an instance from the *mallakadṛṣṭānta* section of *Nandisūtra* where the following illustration is given:

A new earthen pot does not get wet by two or three drops of water but when it is moistened again and again it gets wet because the water is absorbed by the pot. But after repeated pouring down of the drops of water a stage comes when the water becomes visible. According to T.G. Kalghatgi, this example gives a clear picture of the vast depth of the unconscious which absorbs all our wishes and ideas, although the example was meant to explain the process of *avagraha*.<sup>81</sup>

It will not be out of place to consider here briefly the concept of mind in Jainism. The *Tattvārthasūtra* (II.21) considers mind (*manas*) as a sense-organ (*indriya*). In some texts two forms of mind are distinguished, *dravya-manas* and *bhāva-manas*, material mind and the mental states. In the *Gommaṣasāra*, we have reference to *dravyamanas* or material mind



which is figuratively described as of the form of eight-petalled lotus.<sup>82</sup> It is interesting to note that the Jaina philosophers acknowledge the existence of selves without mind besides the existence of selves with mind.<sup>83</sup> Mind is considered as a special sense-organ which is unmanifest; therefore it is called *no-indriya*.

### THE NATURE OF THE SUPREME SELF

In a series of verses Kundakunda describes the ultimate nature of the real self. We quote below two such verses:

80. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, verse 16,

81. T.G. Kalghatgi: *Some Problems in Jaina Psychology*, pp.42-43.

82. *Gommaṣasāra: Jivakāṇḍa*, verse 443.

83. *Tattvārthasūtra*, II.11.

"I am unique in so far as I am of the nature of consciousness. Therefore *dharma* and other things are not related to me. Therefore, he who thinks like this is called 'unrelated to *dharma* and other things' by the knowers of true self. I am indeed unique, absolutely pure, always non-corporeal, and full of perceptual vision of knowledge. Therefore not even an atom of alien thing whatsoever belongs to me".<sup>84</sup>

Those who identify the self with the not-self are perverse minded.

The *Samādhitāntra* declares that the root cause of the sufferings of *saṃsāra* is the false notion of taking the body as the self; therefore one should abandon this notion and controlling the outward tendencies of the senses enter into the innermost core, i.e. the self.<sup>85</sup>

In some Jaina texts a distinction between the self with limitations or attributes and self without limitations or attributes is tacitly assumed. Thus the self (*jīva*, *ātman*) is said to be endowed with the following limitations and attributes. It has life principle, consciousness, cognition; it is doer, it is active, it is enjoyer, it is of the same extent as body, it is formless and it is attached to *karma*.<sup>86</sup> These attributes belong to the *jīva* with limitations or *upādhis*. There are also the corresponding attributes belonging to the self without limitations or *upādhis*, which are as follows.

The liberated self is of pure and perfect existence; it has infinite consciousness; it is endowed with supreme knowledge (*kēvala-jñāna*) and supreme vision (*kēvala-darśana*), it is the Lord by virtue of freedom from *karmas*; it is the real doer in the sense of being independent; it is the enjoyer of the eternal

84. *Samayasāra*, I.37-38.

85. *Samādhitāntra*, verse 15. See also verses 16-17,54-55.

86. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, verse 27.

bliss born of the realisation of the true self; its size is two-third of the size of the body possessed by him last; it is without any physical form being wholly spiritual and it is absolutely free from the bondage of *karmas*.<sup>87</sup>

The attributes and limitations of the self listed in the *Dravyasaṃgraha* are as follows:

The *jīva* is possessed of cognition, it is formless, it is doer, it is of the same extent as its body, it is an enjoyer, it transmigrates in the *saṃsāra*, it is perfect in its essence and it is of the nature of going upward.<sup>88</sup>

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the different forms, functions and characteristics of the self are described only from the *vyavahāra* point of view. The real self that is the goal of Jaina culture is quite distinct and unconnected with any of these things. We read in the *Samayasāra* that the Supreme Self is devoid of taste, colour, smell and sound; it cannot be known through inferential knowledge; its distinction is consciousness (*cetanā*). This description is often repeated in the text in several verses. Thus the pure self is described as free from attachment and hatred; illusion does not exist in it; *karmic* conditions, *karmic* particles and non-*karmic* particles have no trace in it. There is no atomic potency nor any aggregate of molecules in the pure self. It is completely free from egoism and transcends the pair of pleasure and pain. The real *jīva* in its essence does not function either through mind or through speech or through the body because the manifestations of *karma* have disappeared from it. The released self is free from emotions and feelings; it has neither to work for purification nor for self-control. Such is the nature of the Supreme *Self*.<sup>89</sup>

87. *Pancāstikāyasāra*, ed.and tr. By A.N.Upadhye,p.20.

88. *Dravyasaṃgrāha*, verse 2; *Tattvārthasūtra*, X. 4-5; *Jnātadharmakathāṅga*, VI. 62.

89. *Samayasāra*, verses 49-54.

In the *paramātmaprakāśa* we have a detailed picture of Supreme Self (*paramātman*). Here we are told that this self is not known by reading the Vedas and Sāstras, nor it is perceived by the sense; it can be known only through pure meditation. The Supreme Self is endowed with supreme energy. It is this self characterised by these excellent characteristics which is worshipped by the three worlds; this self is called the highest Divinity who dwells in the supreme abode at the top of the universe.<sup>90</sup> The fundamental position of Jaina philosophy is that the self remains the self; it can never become a non-self. Likewise what is non-self or matter remains matter. It can never become the self.<sup>91</sup>

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90. *Paramātmaprakāśa*, I. 23-25.

91. *Ibid.*, I.67.